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This paper describes an eﬃcient watermarking technique for use to protect fingerprint images. The rationale is to embed
the watermarks into the ridges area of the fingerprint images so that the technique is inherently robust, yields imperceptible
watermarks, and resists well against cropping and/or segmentation attacks. The proposed technique improves the performance
of optimum multibit watermark decoding, based on the maximum likelihood scheme and the statistical properties of the host
data. The technique has been applied successfully on the well-known transform domains: discrete cosine transform (DCT)
and discrete wavelet transform (DWT). The statistical properties of the coeﬃcients from the two transforms are modeled by a
generalized Gaussian model, widely adopted in the literature. The results obtained are very attractive and clearly show significant
improvements when compared to the conventional technique, which operates on the whole image. Also, the results suggest that the
segmentation (cropping) attack does not aﬀect the performance of the proposed technique, which also provides more robustness
against other common attacks.
Copyright © 2008 K. Zebbiche et al. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License,
which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
1. INTRODUCTION
Biometric-based authentication systems that use physio-
logical characteristics (fingerprint, face, iris, etc.) and/or
behavioral traits (signature, voice, etc.) of persons are gaining
more and more interest in the last years since they are
based on information that is permanently associated with
a person. Among various commercially available biometric-
based systems, fingerprint-based techniques are the most
mature, extensively studied, and widely deployed. While
biometric-based techniques have inherent advantages over
other authentication techniques such as token-based or
knowledge-based techniques, ensuring the security and
integrity of data is a paramount issue. Recently, water-
marking techniques have been introduced and shown to
be promising for protecting fingerprint data and increasing
the security level of fingerprint-based systems [1–5]. For
example, watermarking of fingerprint images can be used to
secure central databases from which fingerprint images are
transmitted on request to intelligence agencies in order to
use them for identification and classification purposes (see
Figure 1).
Depending on the embedding domain, existing algo-
rithms for image watermarking usually operate either in
the spatial domain [6, 7] or in a transform domain such
as the discrete cosine transform (DCT) [8, 9] and the
discrete wavelet transform (DWT) [10, 11]. However, most
research works have been proposed in the transform domain
because of its energy compaction property which suggests
that the distortions introduced by the watermarks into the
transform coeﬃcients will spread over all the pixels in the
spatial domain so as the changes introduced in these pixels
values are visually less significant. Also, depending on the
embedding rule used, the watermarks are often embedded
using either an additive or a multiplicative rule. Additive rule
has been broadly used in the literature due to its simplicity
[8, 9, 12]. On the other hand, multiplicative rule is more
eﬃcient because it is image dependent and exploits the
characteristics of the human visual system (HVS) in a better
way [13–16].
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Figure 1: Block diagram of a watermarking application for fingerprint images.
(a:1) (a:2) (a:3)
(b:1) (b:2) (b:3)
Figure 2: Test images with diﬀerent ridges area size from DB1:
(a, b: 1) original images (a: Image 98 2, b: Image 20 1), (a, b: 2)
segmentation masks, (a, b: 3) watermarking masks.
Researchers in watermarking domain have focused their
works on two fundamental issues: watermark detection
and watermark decoding (extraction). In the latter, usually
referred to as multibit watermarking, a full decoding is
carried out to extract the hidden message, which can be an
ownership identifiers, transaction dates, a serial numbers,
and so forth. Such a watermarking can be found in finger-
printing, steganography, and the protection of intellectual
property rights. In multibit watermarking, errors may occur
when extracting the hidden message. Error probability can be
used as a measure of the watermarking system performance.
In the literature, optimum decoders have been proposed
and are based on a statistical modeling of the host data.
Hernandez et al. propose a structure of optimum decoder for
additive watermarks embedded within the DCT coeﬃcients,
modeled by a generalized Gaussian distribution (GGD). The
problem of optimum decoding for multiplicative multibit
watermarking has been addressed in [17–19]. In [17], the
authors propose a new optimum decoder of watermarks
embedded in the DFT coeﬃcients modeled using a Weibull
distribution, while Song in [18] proposes a general statistical
procedure based on the total eﬃcient score vector for both
GGD and Weibull distribution. In [19], a new optimum
decoder based on GGD has been proposed for extracting
watermarks embedded within DWT coeﬃcients.
(a:1) (a:2) (a:3)
(b:1) (b:2) (b:3)
Figure 3: Test images with diﬀerent ridges area size from DB2:
(a, b: 1) original images (a: Image 71 4, b: Image 75 7), (a, b: 2)
segmentation masks, (a, b: 3) watermarking masks.
(a:1) (a:2) (a:3)
(b:1) (b:2) (b:3)
Figure 4: Test images with ridges area size from DB3: (a, b:
1) original images (a: Image 47 3, b: Image 73 7), (a, b: 2)
segmentation masks, (a, b: 3) watermarking masks.
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Figure 5: BER as a function of the number of coeﬃcients per bit for the test images. Watermark applied in the DCT domain.
In this work, the main contribution consists of embed-
ding the watermark within the foreground or the ridges area
by avoiding to embed it in the background area. This is
motivated by the following facts.
(i) Embedding watermarks into the ridges area increases
its robustness because an attacker is interested in
that area only (i.e., segmentation or cropping attack
is usually performed to extract the ridges area
from the background). Consequently, a part/portion
of the watermark which is embedded within the
background area can be removed, thus aﬀecting
the robustness of the watermark. Furthermore, to
remove a watermark embedded in the ridges area,
an attacker needs to apply strong attacks (such as
additive noise and filtering) on that area, resulting in
severe degradations of the quality of the image, thus,
making it useless.
4 EURASIP Journal on Information Security
30025020015010050
Number of coeﬃcients per information bit
10−4
10−3
10−2
10−1
100
B
E
R
BER for image 98 2
(a)
30025020015010050
Number of coeﬃcients per information bit
10−3
10−2
10−1
100
B
E
R
BER for image 20 1
(b)
1000900800700600500400300200100
Number of coeﬃcients per information bit
10−3
10−2
10−1
100
B
E
R
BER for image 71 4
(c)
1000900800700600500400300200100
Number of coeﬃcients per information bit
10−3
10−2
10−1
100
B
E
R
BER for image 75 7
(d)
1000900800700600500400300200100
Number of coeﬃcients per information bit
10−2
10−1
100
B
E
R
BER for image 47 3
Proposed technique
Conventional technique
(e)
1000900800700600500400300200100
Number of coeﬃcients per information bit
10−2
10−1
100
B
E
R
BER for image 73 7
Proposed technique
Conventional technique
(f)
Figure 6: BER as a function of the number of coeﬃcients per bit for the test images. Watermark applied in the DWT domain.
(ii) The human eye is less sensitive to noise and changes
in the texture regions; this makes sense to select the
ridges area for watermark embedding and ensures
imperceptibility of the embedded watermarks.
The proposed technique starts by first extracting the ridges
area using the segmentation technique proposed by Wu
et al. [20], which has been modified to generate adap-
tive thresholds instead of fixed ones. The output of the
segmentation results in a binary mask called segmentation
mask. This mask is then partitioned into nonoverlapping
blocks, where only the blocks belonging to the ridges
area are used to carry the watermark. This is represented
by another binary mask called watermarking mask. The
proposed technique has been introduced to increase the
performance of the optimum watermark decoder, whose
structure is theoretically based on a maximum-likelihood
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Figure 7: BER as function of total amount of hidden information bits. Watermark applied in the DCT domain.
(ML) estimation scheme. For the sake of illustration, the
process of watermarking is applied in both the DCT and
the DWT domains, where the transform coeﬃcients in each
domain are statistically modeled using a GGD that has been
shown, in the literature, to be the most accurate statistical
model. The results obtained in this work clearly demonstrate
the performance improvements achieved by the proposed
technique. Also, the segmentation process, which can be
thought of as an attack for fingerprint images, is shown
to have no influence on the overall performance of the
optimum decoder.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes
the technique used to extract the region of interest. A brief
description of watermark generation and the embedding
process for both the DCT and the DWT domains is given
in Section 3. Then, in Section 4, the multibit watermark
decoding (extraction) issue is addressed. The influence of
attacks on the overall performance of the optimum decoder
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Figure 8: BER as a function of total amount of hidden information bits. Watermark applied in the DWT domain.
is assessed through experimentation whose results and
analysis are reported in Section 5. Finally, conclusions are
drawn in Section 6.
2. RIDGES AREA DETECTION AND EXTRACTION
A captured fingerprint image usually consists of two areas:
the foreground and the background. The foreground or
ridges area is the component that originates from the
contact of a fingertip with the sensor. The noisy area at
the borders of the image is called the background area. An
extraction of the ridges area can be carried out by using a
segmentation technique whose objective is to decide whether
a part of the fingerprint image belongs to the foreground
(which is of our interest) or belongs to the background.
Several methods and techniques have been proposed in
the literature for segmenting fingerprint images [21, 22].
However, in our case, the technique must be robust to
common watermarking attacks in the sense that it also
detects the same ridges area even if a fingerprint image is
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subjected to attacks such as compression, filtering, noise
addition. Unfortunately, most of these techniques are not
robust enough to resist image manipulations. In this work,
we propose to use Harris corner point features to segment
the fingerprint images. A Harris corner detector is based on
a local autocorrelation function of a signal to measure the
local changes of the signal with patches shifted by a small
amount in diﬀerent directions [23]. It has been found in [20]
that the strength of a Harris point in the foreground area
is much higher than that in the background area. However,
the authors proposed to use diﬀerent thresholds, which
are determined experimentally for each image. Also, they
noticed that some noisy regions are likely to have a higher
strength which cannot be eliminated even by using high
threshold value and proposed to use a heuristic algorithm
based on the corresponding Gabor response. In our case, we
found that an adaptive threshold can be obtained by using
Otsu thresholding method [24] which provides an excellent
threshold for fingerprint images from diﬀerent databases.
When some morphological methods are applied to eliminate
the noisy regions, excellent segmented images are obtained.
The output of the segmentation process yields a seg-
mented image and/or a segmentation mask. Since Harris
point features method is a pointwise method, the segmen-
tation mask is a binary mask (i.e., 1 if the pixel is assigned to
the foreground area and 0 otherwise) of the same size as the
original image.
Once the ridges area is extracted, one has to ensure
that the watermark will be embedded within this extracted
area. We propose to divide the segmentation mask into
nonoverlapping blocks, where each block is classified as ridge
block or background block according to the number of
foreground pixels belonging to the block at hand (in this
paper, a block is considered to be a ridge block if and only
if all the block’s pixels are classified as a ridge pixel). Finally,
a binary watermarking mask is produced with a value of
1 if the block belongs to the ridges area and 0 otherwise.
Let I[n] = I[n1,n2], 0 ≤ n1 < N1, 0 ≤ n2 < N2 be
a two-dimensional (2D) data representing the luminance
component of the image with size N1 ×N2 pixels and SM[n]
be 2D binary matrix representing the segmentation mask
with N1×N2 components. SM[n] is partitioned into nb1×nb2
nonoverlapping blocks Bij , 0 ≤ i < nb1, 0 ≤ j < nb2, of
m × m pixels, where nb1 = N1/m and nb2 = N2/m. Let
WMi j , where 0 ≤ i < nb1 and 0 ≤ j < nb2 be 2D binary
sequence representing the watermarking mask. Then, WMi j
is obtained as follows:
WMi j =
{
+1, if Bij belongs to the ridges area;
0, otherwise.
(1)
To verify whether the segmentation technique extracts the
ridges area accurately, we have assessed this technique using
real fingerprint images from the FVC2004 databases (DB1,
DB2, and DB3) [25]. The images properties for all selected
databases are shown in Table 1. For the sake of illustration,
only the results obtained on two fingerprint images (Figures
2, 3, and 4) from each database are reported because similar
performances have been achieved while considering other
Table 1: Technologies used for the collection of FVC2004 databases.
Database Sensor type Image size Resolution (dpi)
DB1 Optical sensor 640× 480 500
DB2 Optical sensor 328× 364 500
DB3 Thermal sweeping sensor 300× 480 500
images. The choice has been done on the basis of the
variability of the ridges area size.
Since the watermarks are inserted in the 8 × 8 DCT
blocks, the size of a block is chosen to be a multiple
of 8. The experiments carried out have indicated that m
must be above 32 (m ≥ 32) to provide the same mask
even in the presence of attacks. Furthermore, extensive
experiments were carried out to determine the limitations
of each database in the presence of attacks such as wavelet
scalar quantization (WSQ) compression [26], additive white
Gaussian noise (AWGN), and mean filtering. These results
are necessary since the computed watermarking mask (i.e.,
the selected blocks) will be used to carry the watermark. The
first column of Table 2 reports the highest compression ratio
(in bits per pixel) below which the technique was able to
provide the same watermarking mask. The second column
of Table 2 shows the results obtained for an AWGN attack.
In the case of the mean filtering, the results are shown in the
third column of Table 2. For each database, the mean peak
signal-to-noise ratio (PSNR) values are also shown for each
type of attack in order to assess the distortions introduced.
As can be seen from Table 2, all test images that form
the three databases are robust to mean filtering attack and
the technique can extract the same watermarking mask even
for a filtering attack with a window size of 7 × 7. However,
the test images from database DB2 are more sensitive to
WSQ compression and AWGN attacks than the images from
the other databases. Images from DB1 are very robust to
WSQ compression and images from DB3 are less sensitive
to AWGN.
3. WATERMARK GENERATION AND EMBEDDING
As mentioned previously, the DCT and DWT domains are
used to embed the watermark. The DCT can be applied
either to the entire image or blocks as in the JPEG standard
[27] as well as the DWT. The watermarking algorithm
considered in this work relies on the embedding of a spread
spectrum watermark, which spreads the spectrum of the
hidden signal over many frequencies making it diﬃcult to
detect [28]. The embedding stage starts by decomposing the
fingerprint image into blocks as described in the previous
section (i.e., spatial blocks of m × m pixels) and only the
ridges area blocks are selected to carry the watermark. Thus,
using a watermarking mask WM, if WMi = 1, then block Bi
is selected; otherwise, it remains unchanged.
Assuming that the watermark carries a hidden message M
with information that can be used, for instance, to identify
the intended recipient of the protected image; this message
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Figure 9: Test images from DB1 (a: Image 98 2, b: Image 20 1): (a:1, b:1) diﬀerence image between original image and watermarked image,
(a:2, b:2) diﬀerence image without the ridges area. Watermark applied in the DCT domain with PSNR > 40 using the conventional technique.
(a:1) (a:2)
(b:1) (b:2)
Figure 10: Test images from DB2 (a: Image 71 4, b: Image 75 7): (a:1, b:1) diﬀerence image between original image and watermarked
image, (a:2, b:2) diﬀerence image without the ridges area. Watermark applied in the DCT domain with PSNR > 40 using the conventional
technique.
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Table 2: Watermarking mask extraction in the presence of attacks. The highest attack strength survived by the mask detection is given.
Database
WSQ AWGN Mean filtering
Bit rate (bpp) PSNR SNR (dB) PSNR Kernel size (k × k) PSNR
DB1 0.50 32.72 25 25.70 7× 7 23.87
DB2 0.50 25.67 22 26.20 7× 7 20.23
DB3 1 21.51 25 31.71 7× 7 12.71
(a:1) (a:2)
(b:1) (b:2)
Figure 11: Test images from DB3 (a: image 47 3, b: image
73 7): (a:1, b:1) diﬀerence image between original image and
watermarked image, (a:2, b:2) diﬀerence image without the ridges
area. Watermark applied in the DCT domain with PSNR > 40 using
the conventional technique.
is mapped by an encoder into a binary sequence b =
{b1b2 . . . bNb} of Nb bits (by denoting +1 for bit 1 and −1
for bit 0).
Let W[N] be a pseudorandom sequence uniformly
distributed in [−1, +1], generated using a pseudorandom
sequence generator (PRSG) initialized by a secret key K2.
This pseudorandom sequence is the spreading sequence of
the system. Every bit from the sequence b is then multiplied
by a set from the sequence W[N] in order to generate an
amplitude-modulated watermark, consisting of the spread of
the bits b.
3.1. DCT domain
After selecting the blocks to be watermarked, a DCT
transform is applied on blocks of 8 × 8 pixels, as in the
JPEG algorithm [29]. Specifically, the application of the DCT
on 8 × 8 blocks leads to 64 coeﬃcients which are zigzag
scanned (i.e., arranged in decreasing order) to obtain one
dimensional vector X[N] representing the entire set of the
DCT coeﬃcients to be watermarked (the DC component for
each block is not used). In order to increase the security level,
we propose to introduce some uncertainty about the selected
coeﬃcients altered by permuting the coeﬃcients in X[N]
using a key K1.
The information bits b are hidden as follows.
(i) The sequence X[N] is partitioned into Nb nonover-
lapping sets {Si}Nbi=1. In the following we denote by
xi[k] the coeﬃcients belonging to the set Si, where
xi[k]∩ xj[k] = ∅ for i /= j and
⋃Nb
i=1xi[k] = X[N].
(ii) The watermark sequence W[N] is divided into Nb
nonoverlapping chunks {wi[k]}Nbi=1, where wi[k] ∩
wj[k] = ∅ for i /= j and
⋃Nb
i=1wi[k] = W[N], so that
each chunk wi[k] is associated to one block xi[k] and
both are used to carry one information bit bi.
(iii) Each element of a chunk wi[k] is multiplied by +1
or −1 according to its associated information bit bi.
The result of this multiplication is an amplitude-
modulated watermark wi[k]bi.
(iv) The watermark is embedded using a multiplicative
rule as follows:
yi[k] =
(
1 + λwi[k]bi
)
xi[k], (2)
where xi[k] and yi[k] represent the set of the original
coeﬃcients and the associated watermarked coeﬃ-
cients belonging to the set Si, respectively. λ is a gain
factor used to control the strength of the watermark
by amplifying or attenuating the watermark eﬀect on
each DCT coeﬃcient, so that the watermark energy is
maximized while the alterations suﬀered by the image
are kept invisible.
The hidden watermark can be retrieved if one knows (a)
the entire procedure through which the watermark has been
generated, (b) the secret key K2 used to initialize the PRSG,
and (c) the second key K1 which is used to permute the
coeﬃcients. Thus, an attacker will not be able to extract the
watermark without knowledge of the secrete keys K1 and
K2, even if the entire watermark generation and embedding
process are known.
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3.2. DWT domain
Each block selected to carry the watermark is transformed
using the DWT at a level l, which produces (i) a low-
resolution subband (LL), (ii) high-resolution horizontal
subbands (HLl,HLl−1, . . . ,HL1), (iii) high-resolution verti-
cal subbands (LHl,LHl−1, . . . ,LH1), and (iv) high-resolution
diagonal subbands (HHl,HHl−1, . . . ,HH1). A watermark
should be embedded in the high-resolution subbands, where
the human eye is less sensitive to noise and distortions
[30, 31]. In this work, all coeﬃcients of the high-resolution
subbands are used to carry the watermark sequence and
the set of coeﬃcients to watermarked X[N] is defined as
{⋃li=1HLi}∪{⋃li=1LHi}∪{⋃li=1HHi}. The watermark is then
embedded by following the same steps described above for
the DCT domain.
4. OPTIMUM WATERMARKING DECODER
In the watermark decoding process, the decoder obtains
an estimate b̂ of the hidden message b embedded in the
watermarked coeﬃcients Y[N]. By assuming that all possible
messages {bj}2
Nb
j=1 are equiprobable, a maximum-likelihood
(ML) criterion can be used to minimize the error probability
and hence derive a structure for an optimum decoder. An
optimum ML decoder would decide b̂ ∈ {bj}2
Nb
j=1, such that
b̂ = arg
j=1,...,2Nb
max fY
(
Y[N] |W[N], bj
)
, (3)
where fY (Y |W , bj) is the PDF of the set Y[N] conditioned
to the events W[N] and bj . By assuming that (i) the coef-
ficients Y[N] are statistically independent, this assumption
is justified for the DCT coeﬃcients given the uncorrelated
properties of the DCT for common images and also justified
for the DWT coeﬃcients, and (ii) the hidden sequence b and
the values in W[N] are independent of each other, (3) can be
written as
b̂ = arg
j=1,...,2Nb
max
Nb∏
i=1
fyi
(
yi[k] | wi[k], bji
)
, (4)
where yi[k] indicates the coeﬃcients of the set Si carrying the
bit bi, and wi[k] is a set from W[N] associated to the same
bit bi. The decision criterion for the bit bi can be expressed as
b̂i = arg
bi∈{−1,+1}
max
∏
Si
fyi
(
yi[k] | wi[k], bi
)
= sign
[
ln
(∏
Si fyi(yi[k] | wi[k], +1)∏
Si fyi(yi[k] | wi[k],−1)
)]
.
(5)
According to the multiplicative rule used to embed the
watermark, the PDF fy(y) of a marked coeﬃcient yi[k]
subject to a watermark value wi[k] and bi can be expressed
as
fyi
(
yi[k] | wi[k], bi
) = 1
1 + λwi[k]bi
fx
(
yi[k]
1 + λwi[k]bi
)
, (6)
where fx(x) indicates the PDF of the original, nonwater-
marked coeﬃcients. Substituting (6) in (5), the estimate bit
b̂i is given by [19]
b̂i = sign
[∑
Si
ln
(
1− λwi[k]
1 + λwi[k]
)
+
∑
Si
ln
(
fx(yi[k]/(1 + λwi[k]))
fx(yi[k]/(1− λwi[k]))
)]
.
(7)
The host coeﬃcients of the DCT and the DWT can be
modeled by the Laplacian model [32, 33]. However, they are
widely modeled using a zero-mean GGD whose PDF is given
by
fx(xi;α,β) = β2αΓ(1/β) exp
(
−
( |xi|
α
)β)
, (8)
where Γ(·) is a Gamma function, Γ(z) = ∫∞0 e−ttz−1dt, z >
0. The parameter α is referred to as the scale parameter
representing the width of the PDF peak (standard deviation)
and β is called the shape parameter which is inversely
proportional to the decreasing rate of the peak. Note that
β = 1 and β = 2 yield Laplacian and Gaussian distributions,
respectively. The parameters α and β can be estimated as
described in [34]. Practically, β can be estimated by solving
the following equations of [34]
β = F−1
(
m1√
m2
)
, (9)
where m1 = (1/L)
∑L
i=1|xi| and m2 = (1/L)
∑L
i=1x
2
i are the
estimates of the mean absolute value and the variance of the
sample dataset, respectively. L is the length of the dataset x.
The function F is defined as
F(t) = Γ(2/t)√
Γ(1/t)Γ(3/t)
. (10)
In practical situations, the solution of (9) can be found
quickly by using an interpolation and a look-up table. Once
the value of β is estimated, α is computed using the following
expression:
α =
(
β
L
L∑
i=1
|xi|β
)1/β
. (11)
Substituting (8) in (7), one obtains
b̂i = sign
[∑
Si
ln
(
1− λwi[k]
1 + λwi[k]
)
+
1
α
βi
i
∑
Si
(∣∣∣∣ yi[k]1− λwi[k]
∣∣∣∣
βi
−
∣∣∣∣ yi[k]1 + λwi[k]
∣∣∣∣
βi
)]
.
(12)
5. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
To gauge the eﬀectiveness of our proposed technique, exper-
iments were performed with test images from the databases
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Figure 12: BER as a function of the number of coeﬃcients per bit for the segmented images. Watermark applied in the DCT domain.
FVC2004 (DB1, DB2, and DB3). In the DWT domain, the
images were transformed using Daubechies9/7 wavelets [35]
at the 3rd decomposition level and all coeﬃcients of the
high-resolution subbands (HLl, LHl, and HHl subbands of
the levels l = 1, 2, 3) were used to carry the watermark.
Daubechies9/7 wavelets were used because they have been
adopted by the FBI as part of the WSQ compression
standard for fingerprint images [36]. In all experiments, a
blind watermark decoding is used so that the parameters
αi and βi of each set Si are directly estimated from the
DCT and the DWT coeﬃcients of the watermarked images
since the strength λ is chosen to be suﬃciently small to
not alter the visual quality of the original images. For the
sake of fair comparison, the performance of the proposed
technique is compared against the conventional technique
using the same decoder. By conventional watermarking, it is
meant a technique which operates on the whole transform
coeﬃcients as described in [10, 19]. The performance is
assessed by the bit error rate (BER), that is, the average
number bit errors. For the sake of illustration, only results
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Figure 13: BER as a function of the number of coeﬃcients per bit for the segmented images. Watermark applied in the DWT domain.
related the test images shown in Figures 2, 3, and 4 are plotted
because the results from other images are very similar.
As mentioned earlier, embedding the watermark in the
ridges area (highly textured area) allows the use of a higher
strength λ than that used by the conventional technique at
the same imperceptibility level measured by PSNR. This is
illustrated by Table 3.
It is worth noting that, in the proposed method, the
number of bits that an image can carry is image dependent;
more precisely it depends heavily on the size of the ridges
area: the larger the ridges area is, the more bits can be hidden,
and vice versa. Table 4 shows an example of the number of
bits that test images can carry with the number of coeﬃcients
per set Si = 500. As can be seen, images with large ridges area
(image 98 2, image 71 4, and image 47 3) allow more bits
to be hidden than images with relatively smaller ridges area
(image 20 1, image 75 7, and image 73 7).
In the first analysis, the BER as a function of the number
of coeﬃcients in the set Si is investigated and assessed. This
will help to (a) estimate the number of coeﬃcients necessary
K. Zebbiche et al. 13
600550500450400350300250200
Number of hidden information bits
10−4
10−3
10−2
10−1
100
B
E
R
BER for image 98 2
(a)
200180160140120100
Number of hidden information bits
10−3
10−2
10−1
100
B
E
R
BER for image 20 1
(b)
500450400350300250200150100
Number of hidden information bits
10−3
10−2
10−1
100
B
E
R
BER for image 71 4
(c)
400350300250200150100
Number of hidden information bits
10−3
10−2
10−1
100
B
E
R
BER for image 75 7
(d)
600500400300200100
Number of hidden information bits
10−2
10−1
100
B
E
R
BER for image 47 3
Proposed technique
Conventional technique
(e)
45035025015050
Number of hidden information bits
10−3
10−2
10−1
100
B
E
R
BER for image 73 7
Proposed technique
Conventional technique
(f)
Figure 14: BER as a function of total amount of hidden information bits. Watermark applied in the DCT domain.
for the extraction of the hidden message with low BER and
(b) determine the number of bits that an image can hold. The
results shown by Figures 5 and 6 were obtained by averaging
out 100 watermark sequences randomly generated. The value
of λ was set to obtain a PSNR value ≈ 40 for all test images.
As can be seen from Figures 5 and 6, the proposed
technique outperforms the conventional one, even without
applying any attack. Another point that should be raised
is the influence of the size of sets Si on the performance
of the decoder: the larger the set, the better the results.
This is justified by the fact that a larger set provides more
redundancy in the sense that each bit is carried by a higher
number of coeﬃcients. Furthermore, from the view point
of implementation, a large set can be accurately modeled
and the distribution of its coeﬃcients is well approximated.
However, in the case of the conventional technique operating
on images from DB1 (i.e., image 98 2 and image 20 1,
where the background is almost white), the BER is high
and almost unchanged against an increase of the size of
Si. One can explain this by the fact that, in general, since
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Figure 15: BER as a function of total amount of hidden information bits. Watermark applied in the DWT domain.
a white background and smooth areas produce large number
of null coeﬃcients in both the DCT and DWT domains
and according to the multiplicative rule used, these null
coeﬃcients cannot carry significant portion of watermark,
thereby making these coeﬃcients not reliable for decoding.
We have also investigated the variations of BER against
the total number of hidden information bits. The results
are plotted in Figures 7 and 8 for the DCT and the DWT
domains, respectively. As can be seen, for images form DB2
and DB3, the BER is lower for the proposed technique than
that for the conventional one in the case of small number
of bits. However, as the number of bits becomes higher, the
conventional technique outperforms the proposed one. This
is justified by the fact that the proposed technique provides
coeﬃcients with higher amplitudes, allowing the embedding
of watermarks with higher amplitudes. Therefore, for small
number of bits, the proposed technique can provide enough
coeﬃcients for each bit. On the other hand, the conventional
technique has more coeﬃcients than the proposed one.
Consequently, for large number of bits, the set Si is much
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Figure 16: Robustness against WSQ compression with decreasing bit per pixel. Left side: the DCT domain. Right side: the DWT domain.
larger than that of the proposed technique, thus allowing for
the decoding of the watermark with lower BERs. For images
DB1, the proposed technique outperforms the conventional
one for both the DCT and DWT domains.
As mentioned previously, a common attack that one can
apply to fingerprint images is the segmentation because this
technique preserves most of the ridges area and removes the
background (i.e., removes the watermark embedded within
the background while keeping the ridges area unaltered).
First, we have investigated the dispersion of the watermarks
in the spatial domain in the case of the conventional
technique before showing the portions/parts of the image
removed by the segmentation process (i.e., the portion of the
watermark removed by the segmentation). Figures 9, 10, and
11(a:1, b:1) show the diﬀerence images between the original
images and the corresponding watermarked images while
Figures 9, 10, and 11(a:2, b:2) represent this diﬀerence image
without the watermarked ridges area, which corresponds to
the removed watermark. Here, we only display the results
related to the DCT domain as the results obtained from
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Figure 17: Robustness against white Gaussian Noise with increasing SNR. Left side: the DCT domain. Right side: the DWT domain.
embedding in the DWT domain are very similar. As can be
seen, a relatively large part of the watermark is embedded
within the background area, especially images with small
ridges area (i.e., image 75 7 and image 73 7), which can
be easily removed by segmenting the image. In addition,
it can be said that images from database DB1 make the
exception so that most of the watermark is embedded
within the ridges area and, thus, the segmentation process
will not aﬀect significantly the decoding performance and,
as explained above, this is due to the fact that a white
background produces null coeﬃcients thereby ruling it out
for any eﬀective watermark embedding.
The next analysis consists of extending the previous
experiments but on the segmented images. The results of
the first experiment are plotted in Figures 12 and 13 for the
DCT and DWT domains, respectively, while the results of the
second experiment are plotted in Figures 14 and 15 for the
DCT and the DWT domains, respectively. In the case of our
K. Zebbiche et al. 17
7× 75× 53× 3
Filter size
10−1
100
B
E
R
BER for image 98 2
(a)
7× 75× 53× 3
Filter size
10−1
100
B
E
R
BER for image 98 2
(b)
7× 75× 53× 3
Filter size
10−1
100
B
E
R
BER for image 71 4
(c)
7× 75× 53× 3
Filter size
10−1
100
B
E
R
BER for image 71 4
(d)
7× 75× 53× 3
Filter size
10−1
100
B
E
R
BER for image 47 3
Proposed technique
Conventional technique
(e)
7× 75× 53× 3
Filter size
10−1
100
B
E
R
BER for image 47 3
Proposed technique
Conventional technique
(f)
Figure 18: Robustness against Mean filtering with increasing filter size. Left side: the DCT domain. Right side: the DWT domain.
proposed technique, it can be seen from the figures that the
BER is similar to that of the first experiment, thereby, con-
firming that the segmentation process has no influence on
the performance of the decoding process and the watermark
remains unaltered. For the conventional technique, the BER
increases significantly and the segmentation process causes
a considerable loss of the watermark information for images
from databases DB2 and DB3. However, as expected, the BER
is unchanged in the case of images from DB1.
Extensive experiments have also been conducted to gauge
the performance of the proposed technique with respect to
robustness in comparison with the conventional technique.
Three sets of experiments have been carried out to measure
the robustness of the watermark against the common attacks,
namely, WSQ compression, mean filtering, and AWGN. In
all these experiments, the value of the strength λ is chosen in
such a way to obtain PSNR value ≈ 40 and the number of
coeﬃcients per bit is set to 500. Each attack has been applied
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Table 3: Strength of the watermark λ with PSNR ≈ 40 for both the proposed technique and the conventional technique.
Database Image Technique DCT domain DWT domain
DB1
Image 98 2
Proposed 0.52 0.40
conventional 0.47 0.32
Image 20 1
Proposed 0.55 0.50
conventional 0.45 0.35
DB2
Image 71 4
Proposed 0.31 0.21
conventional 0.28 0.18
Image 75 7
Proposed 0.34 0.23
conventional 0.31 0.21
DB3
Image 47 3
Proposed 0.17 0.13
conventional 0.15 0.11
Image 73 7
Proposed 0.21 0.15
conventional 0.17 0.13
Table 4: Number of bits per image. Watermark embedded using the
proposed technique.
Database Image DCT domain DWT domain
DB1
Image 98 2 120 131
Image 20 1 98 106
DB2
Image 71 4 100 108
Image 75 7 80 88
DB3
Image 47 3 126 137
Image 73 7 38 48
several times by varying the attack strength and reporting
the average value of BER over 100 diﬀerent pseudorandom
watermarks. Note that results related to one image from each
database are plotted since results of other images are similar.
Robustness against WSQ compression is assessed by iter-
atively applying the WSQ compression on the watermarked
images using the WSQ viewer [37] varying the bit-rate value
measured by bits per pixel (bpp). The results for the embed-
ded watermark in the DCT and DWT domains are illustrated
by Figure 16. Due to the segmentation technique used to
extract the ridges area (see Section 2), the compression ratio
is varied between 1.5 bpp and 0.5 bpp for images from DB1
and DB2, and between 1 bpp and 2 bpp for images from
DB3. It is worth mentioning that for all images and the two
domains, the WSQ compression does not aﬀect significantly
the ridges; the visual alterations are more severe in the
background especially around the ridges area. This is due
to the fact that the human eye is less sensitive to changes in
textured areas. As can be seen from Figure 16, the proposed
technique outperforms the conventional technique for all
compression ratios.
Figure 17 shows the results for BER of watermarked
fingerprint images corrupted by AWGN in the DCT and the
DWT domains. The Gaussian noise is added with diﬀerent
value of signal-to-noise ratio (SNR). For all images and both
domains, our proposed technique provides attractive results
and significantly outperforms the conventional technique.
The results for degradations due to a linear mean filtering are
presented in Figure 18. The watermarked fingerprint images
are blurred using mean filter with diﬀerent sizes. It is worth
noting that mean filtering causes a significant degradation
to the visual quality of the images even for window size of
3× 3. In addition, this process aﬀects severely the embedded
watermark and the decoder produces high error rates. For
both transform domains, the proposed technique performs
significantly better than the conventional one for images
from DB1 (improvement of 0.25 for filter window size 3× 3)
while the diﬀerences are very marginal for databases DB2 and
DB3 (around 0.01 in terms of BER).
6. CONCLUSIONS
This paper proposes an eﬃcient technique for use in finger-
print images watermarking. The rationale of the technique
consists of embedding the watermark into the ridges area
of the fingerprint images which constitutes the region of
interest. The key features of the proposed technique are to
(i) preserve the watermark from segmentation which can
be considered as a special case of the cropping attack, (ii)
increase the robustness of the watermark against known
attacks such as filtering, noise, and compression, and (iii)
allow to embed imperceptible watermarks by embedding
in highly textured areas. The technique starts by first
extracting the ridges area from fingerprint images using the
segmentation technique proposed by Wu et al. [20], which
has been modified to generate adaptive thresholds instead
of fixed ones, thereby making it more practical. This leads
to a binary mask referred to as the segmentation mask. In
order to ensure that the full watermark is embedded into the
ridges area, the segmentation mask is partitioned into blocks,
represented by another binary mark called watermarking
mask.
The proposed technique has been applied to the opti-
mum multibit, multiplicative watermark decoding. The
watermark is embedded in the well-known transform
domains, namely, the DCT and the DWT. The optimum
decoder is based on the ML scheme and the coeﬃcients
of the two domains are modeled by a generalized Gaussian
distribution. It is worth mentioning that the number of bits
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that an image can carry is image dependent (i.e., it depends
on the ridges area meaning that a larger area allows more
bits to be embedded and vice versa). The results obtained
clearly show the improvements introduced by the proposed
technique even in the absence of attacks. Furthermore,
as the segmentation technique removes the part of the
watermark embedded within the background area, it aﬀects
the performance of the conventional optimum decoder.
However, this attack has no eﬀect on the proposed technique.
Moreover, the proposed technique provides more robustness
in the presence of attacks such as WSQ compression, mean
filtering, and additive white noise.
Finally, it should be mentioned that the proposed
technique can be easily applied to other biometric images
such as face, hand, and iris, since this type of images has only
one defined region of interest. Also, it can be used to some
natural images whose region of interest can be defined and
extracted.
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Preliminary?call?for?papers
The 2011 European Signal Processing Conference (EUSIPCO?2011) is the
nineteenth in a series of conferences promoted by the European Association for
Signal Processing (EURASIP, www.eurasip.org). This year edition will take place
in Barcelona, capital city of Catalonia (Spain), and will be jointly organized by the
Centre Tecnològic de Telecomunicacions de Catalunya (CTTC) and the
Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya (UPC).
EUSIPCO?2011 will focus on key aspects of signal processing theory and
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relevance and originality. Accepted papers will be published in the EUSIPCO
proceedings and presented during the conference. Paper submissions, proposals
for tutorials and proposals for special sessions are invited in, but not limited to,
the following areas of interest.
Areas of Interest
• Audio and electro?acoustics.
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• Image and multidimensional signal processing.
• Signal detection and estimation.
• Sensor array and multi?channel signal processing.
• Sensor fusion in networked systems.
• Signal processing for communications.
• Medical imaging and image analysis.
• Non?stationary, non?linear and non?Gaussian signal processing.
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Procedures to submit a paper and proposals for special sessions and tutorials will
be detailed at www.eusipco2011.org. Submitted papers must be camera?ready, no
more than 5 pages long, and conforming to the standard specified on the
EUSIPCO 2011 web site. First authors who are registered students can participate
in the best student paper competition.
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